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One of the most important challenges for embodied and grounded theories of cognition
concerns the representation of abstract concepts, such as “freedom.” Many embodied
theories of abstract concepts have been proposed. Some proposals stress the similarities
between concrete and abstract concepts showing that they are both grounded in
perception and action system while other emphasize their difference favoring a multiple
representation view. An influential view proposes that abstract concepts are mapped to
concrete ones through metaphors. Furthermore, some theories underline the fact that
abstract concepts are grounded in specific contents, as situations, introspective states,
emotions. These approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive, since it is possible
that they can account for different subsets of abstract concepts and words. One novel
and fruitful way to understand the way in which abstract concepts are represented is
to analyze how sign languages encode concepts into signs. In the present paper we
will discuss these theoretical issues mostly relying on examples taken from Italian Sign
Language (LIS, Lingua dei Segni Italiana), the visual-gestural language used within the
Italian Deaf community. We will verify whether and to what extent LIS signs provide
evidence favoring the different theories of abstract concepts. In analyzing signs we will
distinguish between direct forms of involvement of the body and forms in which concepts
are grounded differently, for example relying on linguistic experience. In dealing with
the LIS evidence, we will consider the possibility that different abstract concepts are
represented using different levels of embodiment. The collected evidence will help us
to discuss whether a unitary embodied theory of abstract concepts is possible or whether
the different theoretical proposals can account for different aspects of their representation.
Keywords: abstract concepts, abstract words, Italian Sign Language (LIS), sign languages, embodied cognition,
metaphor, signs, iconicity
INTRODUCTION
To what extent are cognitive capacities learnt through action?
According to embodied and grounded views, acting and interact-
ing with the objects and the physical and social entities present in
the environment represent the basis of our cognitive abilities (e.g.,
Wilson, 2002). Research on embodied and grounded cognition
has rapidly grown in the last 10–15 years, as widely acknowledged
by different scholars (e.g., Chatterjee, 2010; Gentner, 2010; for a
review see Borghi and Caruana, in press).
In the last years, much behavioral and neuroscience evi-
dence has been provided, showing that concepts and language
are grounded on perception and action systems (for reviews, see
Gallese and Lakoff, 2005; Barsalou, 2008; Fischer and Zwaan,
2008; Gallese, 2008; Jirak et al., 2010; Meteyard et al., 2012; for
special issues, see Borghi and Pecher, 2011). However, the per-
spective of embodied and grounded cognition is confronted with
some unsolved issues and open challenges. One of the major
challenges is represented by the possibility to account for the
representation of abstract concepts and words meanings (see
the recent special issue by Tomasino and Rumiati, 2013). With
“abstract words meanings” we intend the meaning of words such
as “philosophy” and “truth,” that apparently do not have a sin-
gle, easily identifiable, imaginable and concrete referent. Their
referents are instead situations, events, mental states, conditions.
Specifically, whether the embodied account holds only for con-
crete concepts and words or whether it can be extended to abstract
concepts and words as well is still a matter of debate. A number
of scholars have argued that, while embodied theories are able to
account for words referring to concrete objects (e.g., bottle), sup-
ported by convincing evidence, the story is completely different if
we consider the domain of abstract words, due both to theoreti-
cal limits and to the lack of compelling empirical evidence (e.g.,
Dove, 2009, 2011).
Our paper deals with abstract concepts representation. First,
we will consider the possibility that different degrees of embodi-
ment are involved in the representation of concrete and abstract
concepts. Second, we will verify whether different abstract con-
cepts are represented using different levels of embodiment. We
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will distinguish between direct forms of involvement of the body
and forms in which concepts are grounded differently, for exam-
ple relying on linguistic experience. To handle these theoretical
issues in the present paper we will first provide a brief outline of
the major recent accounts of abstract concepts within embodied
and grounded theories (for recent reviews see Pecher et al., 2011;
Borghi and Binkofski, 2014). The embodied cognition perspective
has indeed developed different proposals that attempt to explain
abstract concepts representation.
The novelty of the present contribution is that we will ver-
ify the solidity of these theories in light of examples taken from
one of the many Sign Languages (from now on SL): the Italian
Sign Language (from now on LIS, Lingua dei Segni Italiana), the
language used within the Italian Deaf community, described and
analyzed since about 30 years.
DEFINITION
Defining abstract concepts and words is not an easy task. It is
noteworthy that the term “abstract” is represented in LIS by a
sign located near the head and referring to something that can-
not be touched and grasped, to something that is not material
and concrete but that rather fades away.
Here we will adopt a rather broad operational definition of
abstract terms. We define abstract the words and the signs that,
differently from concrete ones, do not refer to single, concrete
and manipulable items, but are rather grounded in situations,
events, mental states, etc. Abstract words are typically rated as less
imaginable as concrete ones, they are more complex than con-
crete words since they often refer to relations between elements
rather than to single objects/entities, and they are characterized by
higher intersubjective and intra-subjective variability (see Borghi
and Binkofski, 2014, for clarifications on this definition). Notice
however that the opposition between concrete and abstract con-
cepts might not be a dichotomy but rather a continuum. Ratings
asking people to judge the concreteness of large sets of words
showed that concrete and abstract concepts are distributed in a
bimodal way, falling into two big clusters (according to features,
such as tangibility or visibility); within each cluster, however, the
entities had different concreteness degrees (Nelson and Schreiber,
1992; Wiemer-Hastings et al., 2001).
Despite the difficulty in finding a shared definition, embodied
theories of abstract concepts are numerous; below we will briefly
illustrate the most important ones.
MAIN EMBODIED THEORIES OF ABSTRACT WORDS
According to classical Embodied Cognition (EC) theories of
abstract words there would not be a substantial difference
between concrete and abstract words, since both are grounded
in perception, action and emotional systems. For example, the
abstract concepts of number would be grounded in action due
to finger counting experience (for a review, see Fischer and
Brugger, 2011). Further evidence in support of this view is
obtained by studies that link words to action, for example by
evidence on the Action-sentence Compatibility Effect (ACE).
Results showed that judging the sensibility of sentences which
describe the transfer of both concrete objects and abstract infor-
mation (e.g., “giving the pizza” vs. “giving the information”)
requires less time when the action implied by the sentence
matches the action required to make the response (Glenberg and
Kaschak, 2002; Glenberg et al., 2008a,b). This finding suggests
that the mechanisms underlying transfer of abstract concepts
(e.g., “the information”) are the same as those underlying trans-
fer of concrete ones (e.g., “the pizza”) (see also Guan et al.,
2013).
The other EC theories we will illustrate posit that abstract and
concrete concepts and words are represented differently. Themost
influential one is probably the Conceptual Metaphor Theory,
which states that abstract concepts are represented by image
schemas derived from concrete domains. Evidence supporting
this theory has shown for example that similarity is represented
as closeness, categories as containers, and that the abstract notion
of time is mapped onto the concrete domain of space (e.g.,
Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Gibbs and Steen, 1999; Boroditsky and
Ramscar, 2002; Casasanto and Boroditsky, 2008; Boot and Pecher,
2010, 2011; Casasanto et al., 2010; Flusberg et al., 2010; Lai and
Boroditsky, 2013).
Further theories identify differences in content between con-
crete and abstract concepts. According to Barsalou and Wiemer-
Hastings (Barsalou, 1999; Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings, 2005),
abstract concepts differ from concrete concepts as the first acti-
vate situations and introspective relationships more frequently.
Evidence in favor of this approach is based mainly on results
of feature generation tasks, showing that, whereas with concrete
concepts, such as “bottle,” people tend to produce mostly prop-
erties referring to perceptual characteristics such as color, size,
shape, matter, parts (e.g., “green,” “plastic,” “neck”), abstract con-
cepts such as “freedom” evoke more frequently situations, events,
introspective states (e.g., “running on the grass,” “exiting from
prison,” etc.).
A novel proposal advanced by Vigliocco and colleagues
(Kousta et al., 2011; Vigliocco et al., 2014) states that abstract con-
cepts differ from concrete ones in content, since they rely more
on emotional experience. Analyzing a large database Kousta et al.
(2011) demonstrated that, when imageability was kept constant,
emotional valence was a significant predictor of concreteness
ratings. Recent brain imaging evidence (Vigliocco et al., 2014)
further supports this view.
Other recent approaches, such as the Language and Situated
Simulation Theory (LASS) (Barsalou et al., 2008; Simmons
et al., 2008), the Symbol Interdependence Theory (Louwerse
and Connell, 2011), the proposal by Dove (2011, 2014) and the
Words As social Tools (WAT) proposals (Borghi and Cimatti,
2009; Borghi, 2014; Borghi and Binkofski, 2014; evidence in
Borghi et al., 2011; Scorolli et al., 2011, 2012; Sakreida et al.,
2013), argue that both linguistic and sensorimotor informa-
tion are crucial for conceptual representation. LASS does not
specifically focus on abstract concepts, but on conceptual repre-
sentation more generally. According to LASS, both the linguis-
tic and the simulation system are activated during conceptual
processing; the linguistic system is faster and more superficial,
while the simulation system is engaged for understanding of
meaning. In some situations using the linguistic system repre-
sents a shortcut as it allows to respond immediately to a task
(particularly to linguistic tasks) without necessarily accessing to
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conceptual meaning (Pecher and Boot, 2011). In a similar vein,
Louwerse’s Symbol Interdependency Theory states that shallow
linguistic representations precede deeper perceptual representa-
tions (Louwerse, 2011; Louwerse and Connell, 2011; Connell and
Lynott, 2012).
Compared to the other multiple representation theories, WAT
(Borghi and Cimatti, 2009; Borghi and Binkofski, 2014) and
Dove’s view (Dove, 2014) focus specifically on the difference
between concrete and abstract concepts and words. According
to both views abstract concepts representation relies more on
language than representation of concrete words. In his proposal
on abstract concepts Dove (2011, 2014) stresses the important
scaffolding role language can play and the fact that the abilities
acquired thanks to language allow its use not only as a means
of communication but of thought as well. The main tenets of
WAT are the following: a. both concrete and abstract concepts
are embodied and grounded in perception and action systems,
b. for abstract concepts linguistic information plays a more cru-
cial role than for concrete ones, c. this is due to the different
acquisitionmodality of concrete and abstract words; d. this distri-
butional difference is reflected in the representation in the brain
of concrete and abstract concepts, e. given that representation
of abstract concepts is more influenced by language, linguistic
diversity has a major impact on abstract concepts representa-
tion. An important principle of the WAT proposal concerns the
acquisition mechanism of the two kinds of words: with concrete
words, the concrete entities (e.g., book) can be perceived together
with their linguist labels. In the case of abstract words, the lin-
guistic experience might be more important, because typically
abstract words do not have a single concrete referent and also
because they usually refer to exemplars differing to a great extent.
Verbal labels are hence used to assemble a set of quite sparse and
diverse sensorimotor experiences (e.g., we probably put together
different experiences of freedom once we have learned the word
“freedom”). Evidence in support of this proposal is multifaceted
(for review see Borghi and Binkofski, 2014). Brain imaging stud-
ies demonstrated greater engagement of the verbal system for
processing of abstract concepts and greater engagement of the
perceptual and motor system for concrete concepts (e.g., Binder
et al., 2005; Sabsevitz et al., 2005; Rüschemeyer et al., 2007; Desai
et al., 2010; Sakreida et al., 2013), and behavioral research has
shown a high cross-linguistic variability with abstract words (e.g.,
Boroditsky, 2011). Notably, acquisition evidence has shown that
the process of acquisition of the two kinds of words might dif-
fer (e.g., Wauters et al., 2003; Borghi et al., 2011). In particular,
studies onMode of Acquisition (MOA) (e.g., Wauters et al., 2003)
have shown that children acquire the meaning of concrete words,
such as “bottle,” associating the word with its referent, the bot-
tle, or with an action typically performed with or on the bottle
by themselves or by another individual (Capirci et al., 2005).
The meaning of abstract words like “grammar” or “philosophy,”
instead, has to be explained by means of language. Finally, the
meaning of a word like “tundra” can be acquired in both ways,
depending on the environment where it is learned. MOA ratings,
which correlate but are not totally explained by age of acquisition,
concreteness and imageability, gradually change with age: initially
acquisition is mainly perceptual, later it is mainly linguistic.
THE CHALLENGE
The question theorists adopting an EC approach have to ask is
the following: is it possible to account for abstract words with a
unified framework? Isn’t it possible, instead, that the domain of
abstract words is not homogeneous, and that the different subsets
of abstract words have to be explained relying on different mech-
anisms? Recent studies showing fine-grained differences between
subsets of abstract words (e.g., Ghio et al., 2013; Roversi et al.,
2013) suggest that this might be the case. For example, abstract
words as diverse as “category,” “truth,” and “risk” could rely on
different mechanisms: the first could metaphorically evoke a con-
tainer (Boot and Pecher, 2010), the second could evoke linguistic
information and the third might activate situations. If this is true,
this would lead us to abandon the overall notion of abstractness
and to partition the domain into sub-domains of abstract words.
One intriguing way to understand the way in which abstract
words are represented and to deal with the challenge abstract
words pose to the EC perspective is to analyze how they are dealt
with in sign languages. In our opinion, the way in which sign lan-
guages encode concepts into signs can help us understand how
abstract linguistic items are represented, and which theory among
those on abstract concepts can better account for their meaning.
Linguistic research undertaken since Stokoe’s (1960) seminal
work on American Sign Language (ASL) has led to the discovery
and description of a very large number of national sign languages,
now widely recognized by the scientific community as full-
fledged, natural languages, which include Italian Sign Language
or LIS (Volterra, 1987; Pizzuto and Corazza, 1996). In the last edi-
tion of the Ethnolog database 137 Sign Languages (SL) are listed.
It has been shown that, even though these languages are perceived
and produced in the visual-gestural (rather than in the vocal-
auditory)modality, they satisfy the communicative and expressive
needs of a community and possess all the basic linguistic compo-
nents including phonological, lexical, syntactic and grammatical
systems. Just as words of a spoken language are formed on the
basis of phonemes in various combinations, all signs of a signed
language are formed by combining a defined number of forma-
tional parameters (called also as cheremes). More precisely, a
sign can be broken down into four basic parameters: the form
or configuration taken on by the hand; the orientation the hand
takes on while making the sign; the location in which the sign is
performed; the movement the hand describes.
As Penny Boyes Braem pointed out already in 1981, signed lex-
ical units are often made up of formal features visually motivated
and thereby iconic. Their visual motivation is not idiosyncratic,
it derives from regularities at the level of formational parameters.
Handshapes, for example, are often linked to features of a sign’s
meaning via reference to some peculiar visual forms (Pizzuto
et al., 1995; Pietrandrea and Russo, 2007). The same holds true
for location and often for movement (for a comprehensive analy-
sis of the iconicity of the LIS parameters, see Pietrandrea, 2002).
In spite and beyond important structural resemblances between
Sign Languages and Vocal Languages, equally relevant structural
differences need to be taken in due account (Sutton-Spence, 2005;
Cuxac and Sallandre, 2007; Pizzuto et al., 2007; Perniss et al.,
2010; West and Sutton-Spence, 2010; Boyes Braem et al., 2012;
Meurant et al., 2013; Perniss and Vigliocco, 2014). The grammar
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and the syntax of a sign language are expressed in various ways,
including use of space, modulation of movement, facial expres-
sion and position of the trunk and shoulders. A great deal of
research has been carried out on the signs used by the Deaf
Italian community (a complete bibliography on LIS is available at
biblioLIS http://www.istc.cnr.it/sites/default/files/u182/bibliolis_
arg_2011.pdf).
To our knowledge the relationship between sign languages and
abstract concepts has been investigated in a few studies so far
(e.g., West and Sutton-Spence, 2010). In 2005 the Journal “Sign
Language Studies” devoted a Special Issue to a crosslinguistic
analysis of SL in the metaphorical domains of thought and com-
munication. Linguists studying different sign languages (British,
American, Catalan, and Italian) examined the mappings involved
in SL metaphors, showing the process of embodiment active in
metaphorical structures. Some structures share similarities across
sign languages but there are also some interesting differences.
Russo (2005) suggests that signed language metaphors are intrin-
sically related to aspects of the linguistic and cultural dimensions
of a specific deaf community. More recently Roush (2011) has
addressed the issue of the cognitive representation of abstract
terms in sign languages. The author analyzed how a number
of abstract words are represented in American Sign Language
(ASL). Roush (2011) applied a specific linguistic-cognitive frame-
work, the Conceptual Metaphor Theory, to investigate how the
area of (im)politeness is conceptualized through metaphors and
reflected and iconically represented in ASL. Our approach shares
with Roush the view that using sign languages is an impor-
tant perspective helping understand the way in which concepts
are represented, however the ultimate aim why we use sign lan-
guages for investigating cognitive issues is slightly different. While
Roush focuses on a specific theory we move from a variety of
embodied theories struggling to account for abstract concepts
representation. Specifically, our investigation is aimed at analyz-
ing how abstract concepts belonging to different domains are
represented in LIS, assuming that this analysis will allow us to
understand whether the category of abstract terms is homo-
geneous or whether it needs to be re-organized into different
sub-sets.
HYPOTHESES
We advance the following hypotheses. First, in line with all
embodied theories we predict that all the considered abstract con-
cepts are at least in part grounded in the sensorimotor system.
This guarantees the fact that the problem of symbol grounding
(Harnad, 1990) is not present, since symbols used to represent
abstract concepts are not arbitrarily linked to their referents.
At the same time, however, we predict that theories taking into
account only sensorimotor nonlinguistic information will not be
able to explain all examples we provide. In our view a unified
framework, either based only on sensorimotor (for a review, see
Pecher et al., 2011) or only on linguistic information (e.g., Paivio,
1986) will not be able to account for the differences between kinds
of abstract concepts. In line with multiple representation theo-
ries we predict, instead, that to account for some abstract con-
cepts a combination of sensorimotor, emotional, and linguistic
information will be necessary. With “linguistic information” we
intend any kind of exploitation of forms derived from any kind
of language, be the same sign language or a different sign or
spoken language. An example is the concept of “causation”: it is
grounded in sensorimotor information since it might activate a
variety of situations in which, for example, one element deter-
mines an effect on another one (e.g., a ball hurting another ball
and provoking its movement, a handle being pressed to open a
door etc.); at the same time, however, to acquire the concept chil-
dren might rely on explanations of what causation is provided
by others, such as parents or teachers, or by authoritative written
sources, such as dictionaries, encyclopedias, etc. Another exam-
ple highlighting how the formation of abstract concepts can rely
on linguistic sources is the concept of “linguistics,” which origi-
nates from and refers to the more concrete concept of “language.”
Specific examples pertaining SLs, such as LINGUISTICS, LAN-
GUAGE, TRUTH, etc., are discussed later in the paper. To highlight
the role of linguistic information we have selected on purpose
concepts where the role of linguistic elements is particularly evi-
dent, even if sensorimotor information still plays a role. This
combination of sensorimotor and linguistic information is what
we mean when we speak of “different levels of embodiment.”
LIS EVIDENCE
In the present section we will provide novel evidence on LIS
signs supporting the most important theories we have presented.
The examples we are going to illustrate and discuss are mainly
taken from a corpus collected by Gianfreda (2011; Gianfreda
et al., 2014). The corpus was originally collected to explore the
linguistic forms through which Italian Sign Language (LIS) sign-
ers realize communicative functions related to the expression
of certainty and uncertainty, focusing on dimensions already
explored for spoken Languages and for which theoretical con-
structs such as epistemic modality and evidentiality have been
proposed. Conversations in LIS between deaf people commu-
nicating through a video-chat software have been collected and
analyzed. In this type of interaction, the technological instrument
itself permits to record the conversations in a less intrusive man-
ner. Both participants are obliged to maintain themselves in front
of the webcam and to optimize video quality in order to under-
stand their sign language productions. The software automatically
creates, in real time, two video windows for each interlocutor;
through split-screen it is possible to analyze efficiently the syn-
chronization between signs, facial expressions and body actions
produced by both participants. Focusing on low-structured inter-
actions we have been able to observe linguistic units typical
of LIS as they spontaneously emerge in effective situations of
language use.
The corpus consisted of six exchanges: four completely free
and two on a suggested topic. The time duration range of conver-
sations was from 23 to 51min. Conversational exchanges in which
signers were expressing certainty and/or uncertainty have been
identified and transcribed through Sign Writing (SW: Sutton,
1999). SW is a system based on a set of “glyphs,” which, com-
bined together in graphic units, permit to write or transcribe
signs, allowing an external reader to reconstruct sign language
forms. A textual qualitative analysis has been conducted to better
identify and describe the linguistic forms used by the LIS signers.
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All examples of signs provided and words reported in the
present paper to support different theories of abstract con-
cepts are selected from the corpus above described except for
the last three LIS signs mentioned in the present paper: LAN-
GUAGE/LINGUAGGIO, LINGUISTICS, and COMMUNICATION. Our
analysis has obviously no pretense to be exhaustive. However, we
believe that providing examples supporting or disconfirming a
given theory is a useful strategy. Consider for example studies
providing support to the Conceptual Metaphor Theory: in one
study it is shown that similarity is conceived as spatial contiguity
(Boot and Pecher, 2010), in another that category is intended in
terms of container (Boot and Pecher, 2011), in many studies it is
shown that the abstract notion of time is conceived in terms of
the more concrete notion of space (e.g., Boroditsky and Ramscar,
2002; Casasanto, 2008). These examples provide support to the
theory, even though they do not tell us that the theory is neces-
sarily always true. At the same time, providing even one single
example disconfirming a theory can widely limit its application
range, or its generality. This is exactly the strategy we will follow in
the present paper. In the present text signs are reported by English
glosses and often by figures.1 A complete list of all the figures can
be found in the supplementary materials.
Different signs can provide support for the Conceptual
Metaphor Theory. Specifically, we will refer to examples that
highlight the use of body parts in an iconic way to refer to under-
lying metaphors. These manual signs are executed in different
iconically motivated body parts (e.g., eyes, head, chest).
Concrete examples are represented by the LIS signs glossed
as SEE and HEAR. Both verbs refer to the acquisition of char-
acteristics of external reality through the appropriate sensorial
organs. The movement of the first sign starts from the eye toward
the external space while the second sign is executed near the ear
with a movement toward the body. Two further signs are exe-
cuted in these face locations, i.e., PERCEIVE-THROUGH-SIGHT
and PERCEIVE-THROUGH-HEARING.
These two signs share the same configuration and the same
movement, but their different locations indicate the different
sensorial modalities (sight and hearing) through which the per-
ceptions occur. Notice that deaf people tend to exclude audition
when they refer to perceptual activity in general since this modal-
ity is not very useful in their representation of the world. The
verbs HEAR and PERCEIVE-THROUGH-HEARING are strictly asso-
ciated to experiences of hearing individuals. This aspect helps us
understand why in LIS the notion KNOWING IS SEEING is more
meaningful and therefore more used. Several metaphors rely on
this concept and explain many LIS lexical units. For example in
the sign CLEAR (Figure 1) both hands are initially located in front
1Glosses, better known as interlinear glosses, are used in different areas of
linguistics in order to give an account of the meaning/description of the mor-
phemes of a given language. The use of glosses in sign language research is a
useful practice, but should not be considered a self sufficient representation
system neglecting the general requirement of being associated with a tran-
scription of the form of the morpheme. Otherwise it is not possible to verify
(discuss or contradict) anymorphological analysis conducted, since no formal
property of the sign can be used in order to check the consistency of data and
analysis provided (Pizzuto and Pietrandrea, 2001; Petitta et al., 2013).
of the eyes with hand configurations suggesting an initial par-
tial obscurity. The two hands move laterally, away from the body,
expressing broad, unimpeded perception. The same hand con-
figuration is used for the sign SEEM, which is typically used to
express something acquired through perception. The association
between the perceived entity and its interpretation is uncertain
(for the corresponding ASL sign, see Wilcox and Wilcox, 1995;
Wilcox and Shaffer, 2006).
The location in which the sign SEEM is produced, i.e., the space
between the forehead and the eyes, reflects perceptual and cogni-
tive processes. The signer indicates that his/her epistemic belief
concerning the content he/she is expressing is grounded on some
kind of evidence, which should be further verified. The sign can
be linked not only with inferences based on acquired evidence
but also on memory retrieval. When the sign SEEM is produced
with half-closed eyes, and sometimes also with tensed cheeks, it
expresses a focusing process concerning perception or memory.
Many verbs are produced around the forehead. For exam-
ple, TO LEARN, TO KNOW, TO UNDERSTAND, TO FORGET, TO
REMEMBER, and ACKNOWLEDGED all seem to link to the under-
lying metaphor of the head as the location of cognitive and
memory activities. For the sign ACKNOWLEDGED, the signer first
locates his/her index finger in the direction of the head; after
this first movement a quick rotation of the wrist with the open
hand follows, representing the sign translatable as FINISH, which
allows indicating the completion of the action expressed from
the main verb. The mental process is signaled in a slightly differ-
ent way from the sign TO KNOW (Figure 2) in which the fingers
thumb, index and medium, extended, quickly touch each other.
FIGURE 1 | LIS sign CLEAR.
FIGURE 2 | LIS sign TO KNOW.
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In the sign TO REMEMBER, instead, the index and medium fin-
ger, extended and joined, are placed on the forehead, suggesting
that the remembered object is stably located within the head.
Some of these verbs, also located around the forehead, i.e., TO
LEARN, TO UNDERSTAND, and TO FORGET, rely on the under-
lying metaphor of the MIND AS CONTAINER: perceptual traces,
recalls, linguistic information, conceptual nets are formed and
stored in the head. Clearly present in the conceptual metaphor
here is a movement toward or away from the head. One of the
clearest examples is the sign TO LEARN in which all the extended
digits quickly touch each other andmove toward the signer’s fore-
head as if bringing in something from the external space (see
SupplementaryMaterials). The same digit configuration, but with
the palm of the hand orientated laterally to the head and com-
bined with a repeated circular movement is found in the sign
TO THINK (see supplementary materials). The forehead location,
symbolizing the place where the “objects” of perceptual, mnestic
and cognitive processes can be seen andmanipulated, explains the
formation of many lexical units in a variety of sign languages (see
Brennan, 2005; Jarque, 2005; Russo, 2005; Wilcox, 2005, 2007).
Another interesting example is the sign TO UNDERSTAND
(Figure 3), which uses the same movement found in LIS to indi-
cate grasping of physical objects. The main difference between
the signs TO UNDERSTAND and TO GRASP is in their location:
to grasp is located in the neutral space in front of the signer’s
chest, whereas TO UNDERSTAND is produced near the signer’s
head; this clearly represents a form of metaphorical extension,
as it suggests that understanding is grasping and putting some-
thing in the head-container (Russo, 2004). This metaphor reflects
the Latin etymology of the word com-prehendere, which is main-
tained also in other European sign languages. In ASL, a different
underlying metaphor is present: the concept TO UNDERSTAND
is conveyed through a fist-like handshape placed near the fore-
head from which the index finger is then extended, indicating the
emergence of a thought-object from mental processes (Wilcox,
2005).
The metaphor of the head as container underlies also the LIS
sign TO FORGET (Figure 4), in which the closed hand moves to
the other side of the head, symbolizing the sliding away of a men-
tal object which had been previously “grasped” by the signer, and
opens: the close hand indeed moves away from the head toward
the lateral space.
FIGURE 3 | LIS sign TO UNDERSTAND.
The examples discussed so far support the idea that abstract
terms are represented through conceptual metaphors. But some
signs, such as TO LEARN, TO UNDERSTAND, TO FORGET, also sup-
port the ACE view, as actions executed with physical objects are
relevant for the representation of the concept expressed through
the metaphor.
Other LIS signs expressing uncertainty are linked to a concrete
physical object such as a balance.
In the LIS sign TO DOUBT (Figure 5) the oscillating move-
ment of the two hands with downward orientated palms expresses
uncertainty. The ASL sign MAYBE looks very similar but the hand
configuration differs, as the hand palms are oriented upwards,
referring more explicitly to a balance with two similar weights,
metaphorically extended to cognitive activity (Wilcox andWilcox,
1995; Wilcox, 1996).
The LIS signs PERHAPS/MAYBE and ABOUT both have hand-
shapes and locations which are very similar to that of TO DOUBT,
but differ in their movement of an oscillating wrist. These two
signs occur, however, in different contexts, in which they are
accompanied by different mouth2 patterns. PERHAPS tends to
reinforce hypothetic statements, or to reduce the impact of the
speaker’s statements. ABOUT, instead, can be mostly found in
2In LIS, as in all sign languages analyzed sofar, signs are often accompanied by
mouth patterns. Two main categories are distinguished: (i) mouthings which
are derived and represent words or parts of words from a spoken language, and
(ii) mouth gestures which are idiomatic gestures produced by the mouth not
related to a spoken language (Boyes Braem and Sutton Spence, 2001; Fontana,
2008).
FIGURE 4 | LIS sign TO FORGET.
FIGURE 5 | LIS sign TO DOUBT.
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expressions in which the signer defines numerical quantities
or time periods, ascribing a character of approximation to the
expressed values.
Other signs are executed on different body locations, which
can also provide a motivation from an iconic point of view. For
example many LIS signs executed on the chest are referring to
feelings, such as LOVE, HATRED, RAGE. However, signs linked to
mental activity can also be produced near the chest. For example,
the sign TO BELIEVE (Figure 6) is made with the upper side of the
two fists touching the heart; in LIS this sign can also mean TRUST.
A sign that specifically supports the ACE view is TO CON-
STRAIN. In this “agreement verb,” the hand (thumb and index
finger bent as if to grasp a small object) can move toward the
signer’s neck or with reversed palm orientation move toward
another point in space. This change in palm orientation and
movement direction specifies the arguments of the verb (“x is
constrained by y,” “x constrains y”). The underlying metaphor is
clearly linked to the expression “Grab somebody by the throat.”
A more abstract version of this sign is made in neutral space,
with a sharp downward wrist flexion. This version of the sign
is glossed as BY FORCE (Figure 7). In this sign the constraining
agent is less salient or completely absent and the sign refers to
actions where a norm should be applied. It is often used with
an epistemic value: to ascertain that the described facts are as
they should be, or that given qualities or actions are necessary
to realize or accomplish a given state of affairs. Another LIS sign
directed toward the speaker’s neck expresses the signer’s obliga-
tion but with a different hand configuration (bent V). This sign
(TO BE CONSTRAINED) expresses an obligation not determined
by an agent but by the external events.
Evidence favoring the theory that emotions characterize
abstract concept representation (Kousta et al., 2011) can be found
not only in the LIS sign TO BELIEVE discussed previously, but also
in the sign TO EXPRESS ONESELF (see Supplementary Materials).
In this sign, the two hands move up and outward in an arc
from the chest toward external space, opening to a spread “5
handshape,” an action resembling the way in which we throw
objects out of a container. It might not be necessarily obvious
how these two concepts imply emotional components; however,
as clarified in the introduction, according to the view proposed
by Kousta et al. (2011) and Vigliocco et al. (2014) view all
abstract concepts have emotional components, even if in different
degrees. Compared to the head, the chest activates more general
FIGURE 6 | LIS sign TO BELIEVE.
metaphors, linked not only to cognitive aspects but to emotional
elements as well.
The specific metaphors underlying the signs often reflect cul-
tural differences. For example, in Japanese Sign Language, signs
related to thinking are executed in the area surrounding the chest
(Wilcox, 2005). In Catalan Sign Language (LSC) ideas can be con-
ceived as having liquid form and the results of learning process
can be shown as a liquid contained in the learners’ lower torso
(Jarque, 2005).
A variety of signs provide support for the theory according
to which abstract terms refer more frequently to situations com-
pared to concrete terms, which refer instead more often to objects
and their properties. The three LIS signs in Figures 8, 9 highlight
the importance of situations for concepts etymology and repre-
sentation: they show that signs used in specific situations develop
from signs used in similar situations and could all be glossed with
the same English word IMPOSSIBLE. These three signs, however,
all have different forms, different origins, and are used in different
sentences to express a slightly different meaning.
These three signs are examples of the phenomena of semantic
change: signs that are initially grounded can become progressively
more abstract and less transparent3 from an iconic perspective.
3Research on iconicity has traditionally distinguishes between transparent
(the meaning can be guessed by everyone), translucent (a non-signer can
choose among alternative the right ones, once the meaning is known) and
opaque (no iconically motivated link can be found) signs (Bellugi and Klima,
1976; Klima and Bellugi, 1979; Pizzuto and Volterra, 2000; Perniss and
Vigliocco, 2014).
FIGURE 7 | LIS sign BY FORCE.
FIGURE 8 | LIS sign IMPOSSIBLEH-pa-pa.
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FIGURE 9 | LIS sign IMPOSSIBLEH-fff.
The sign glossed as IMPOSSIBLEH-pa-pa4, is probably derived from
another sign, FORBID, with which it shares the same handshape
(extended index and middle fingers) and downward movement.
In IMPOSSIBLEH-pa-pa, however, the movement is repeated and
more rapid. This form has assumed a more general meaning,
allowing the signer to express the impossibility of an event or
action, due to a decision taken from an authority, to the presence
of unfavorable circumstances or to the absence of the necessary
conditions for its implementation. The signer would use another
sign glossed as IMPOSSIBLEH-fff in which the extended fingers
move upward in a circular movement to categorically exclude the
possibility that the conditions for an event to take place could
exist. Wilcox et al. (2010) have proposed an interesting hypothesis
on the origin of this LIS sign, which is relevant for us as it supports
the idea that abstract words refer to events and situations. The
sign IMPOSSIBLEH-fff seems to originate with the blessing gesture
typical of Christian religion, and is similar to the gesture that has
been historically reported to be used by speakers from the South
of Italy to refer to a dead or dying person. It is worth noticing that
this last variant has been incorporated into LIS as an autonomous
lexical unit, i.e., the sign DEAD, produced without the mouth
gesture “fff” which is co-produced in IMPOSSIBILEH-fff. The con-
ceptual link between the blessing gesture and the sign expressing
death is motivated by a metonymic contiguity, since priests are
commonly required to bless dead people or people who are going
to die. Given that death is associated to the preclusion of the pos-
sibility to live, it would have led metaphorically to the emergence
of the extreme notion of impossibility expressed through the sign
IMPOSSIBILEH-fff.
The third LIS sign, IMPOSSIBLEAA (Figure 10), has a semantic
value that is less specific than the other two signs, as it expresses
the notion that the conditions allowing a given action or event are
absent, or that something cannot have given characteristics. This
two-handed sign derives from the sign POSSIBLEAA (Figure 11),
in which the signer expresses an evaluation on the existence of
actual or potential conditions allowing an action or event. Both
IMPOSSIBLEAA and POSSIBLEAA have the same hand configuration
(two fists) but are performed with different movements. In POS-
SIBLEAA the two hands execute simultaneous repeated downward
4The letter “H” reported in subscript is conventionally used because this
handshape represents the letter H in themanual alphabet. The symbol “pa-pa”
refers to the mouth gesture obligatorily requested in the sign execution.
FIGURE 10 | LIS sign IMPOSSIBLEAAA.
FIGURE 11 | LIS sign POSSIBLEAAA.
FIGURE 12 | LIS sign TRUE.
movements, while in IMPOSSIBLEAA the negation of a possibility
is expressed through the alternate rotation of the forearms; this
negation can be reinforced through a shaking head “no” move-
ment. The close similarity between these two signs, POSSIBILEAA
and IMPOSSIBILEAA, illustrates how similarities and differences
in the forms of signs are linked to semantic relations and/or
oppositions (see Wilcox et al., 2010; Gianfreda et al., 2014).
A different kind of situational conditioning is found in signs
whose forms are influenced by the spoken or written language.
For example, the LIS sign TRUE (Figure 12) has a handshape
which is also used for the letter V in the manual alphabet
(extended index and middle fingers) and adds movement down
and to the left of the face. This sign is typically used by signers,
either to convey the idea that the described state of affair is true,
or in order to clarify that the expressed position is valid.
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The abstract meaning of “true” and “truth” is thus conveyed
in LIS using a strategy known as “initialization.” In sign lan-
guages some signs are linked to the corresponding words through
the use of a hand configuration which in the manual alphabet
(used also in fingerspelling) represents the initial letter of the
word having a corresponding meaning. In spoken/written Italian
the corresponding words to the English words “true” and “truth”
are “vero” and “verità,”both starting with the letter V. Other
parameters of the lexical unit, such as movement and location,
are not linked to the spoken/written language but are motivated
by other factors. While LIS does not distinguish between “true”
and “truth,” in ASL the two notions are represented differently.
TRUE is represented by using a sign grounded on the straight-path
image schema (Roush, 2011), placing the dominant index finger
against the signer’s lips and then moving the finger forward sev-
eral inches using a quick motion. So, the meaning of “true” is
represented through the image of an object sent from the mouth
along a straight line. In the nominalization form, TRUTH, the sign
is slightly varied in that the dominant hand with extended index
and middle fingers move in a straight line to make contact with
the open palm of the nondominant hand.
These examples help us understand how, in keeping with the
WAT theory, the formation of abstract concepts can be influenced
by multiple factors, some of which have linguistic origin.
These analyses show that the parameters of the sign’s form can
be motivated both by factors internal to the sign language as well
as by the signers’ relationship with another language having other
characteristics, such as the spoken/written language.
A further example of how forms are influenced by other lan-
guages are seen in two other LIS signs. In Italian two different
terms are used to distinguish the faculty for language (linguaggio)
from a specific language used by a community of users (lingua)
while in English the two concepts are labeled with the same term:
“language.”
These concepts are also differentiated by two different signs in
LIS: in LANGUAGE/LINGUAGGIO (Figure 13) the hand moves up
from the chest toward the external space and opens to a spread
5 handshape (very similar to the sign TO EXPRESS ONESELF); in
LANGUAGE/LINGUA (Figure 14) both hands have an handshape
associated with the letter “L” in the manual alphabet (extended
index finger, thumb extended laterally). The hands, which are
initially located in proximity of the mouth, move symmetrically
forward with a wrist rotation. The sign LINGUISTICS (Figure 15)
FIGURE 13 | LIS sign LANGUAGE/LINGUAGGIO.
is very similar to the sign LANGUAGE/LINGUA, with the only
exception that at the end of the movement the hands close into
fists.
A final example is the LIS sign COMMUNICATION. This sign is
similar to the ASL sign for the same concept: both hands have a
handshape like the letter “C” in the manual alphabet and move
forward and backward with a reciprocal alternate movement,
possibly reflecting the underlying metaphor that “interaction is
exchanging objects” (Roush, 2011). In LIS this sign has undergone
interesting changes. In the past the sign was made in front of the
mouth; now the sign is executed in the neutral space in front of
the signer, perhaps related to a more recent cultural change in the
concept resulting in communication not being conceived as being
limited to spoken communication, but as also including manual
and more general body communication.
All of the examples discussed above are interesting because
they combine a strategy based on initialization with a process
in which specific body parts (mouth, hand) and movements are
involved to constrain and delimit the meaning.
CONCLUSION
Our analyses and the examples provided are consistent with
embodied and grounded theories of cognition, according to
which abstract concepts are grounded in perception, action and
emotional systems. What we find most important, however, is
that sign languages can clarify the different kinds of grounding
and thus contribute to the debate about how embodied theories
can account for astractness. We considered and found examples
supporting different kinds of embodied theories. The examples
FIGURE 14 | LIS sign LANGUAGE/LINGUA.
FIGURE 15 | LIS sign LINGUISTICS.
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we made do not allow us to claim that a given theory is more
valid compared to other theories. More systematic analyses would
be necessary to advance such a claim. However, we think we are
entitled to argue a. that an example can support or not a theory,
or more than one theory; b. that, if the theory A is not able to
explain a given sign which is rather explained by the theory B, the
theory A cannot be considered as exhaustive.
We will discuss below what we consider the most important
theoretical implications of the present work.
DIFFERENT LEVELS OF BODILY INVOLVEMENT
First, our analysis indicates that, even if in sign languages the body
is always involved to convey meanings, this involvement occurs
at different levels. Skeptics of an embodied cognition perspective
might object that it is not completely surprising that sign lan-
guages would provide evidence of grounding, given their visual
nature and in particular the large amount of iconicity utilized by
the language. In sign languages the coupling between language
processing and sensori-motor processing becomes indeed more
evident than in spoken languages. The body is always involved in
spoken languages, for example through vocal articulators but in
Sign languages the body, the hands and facial expressions become
the main articulators. For example, the hands used for everyday
activities such as pointing, enumerating or manipulating objects
are also used for representing the same activities.
At the same time, however, it is possible to detect different
levels of embodiment through a sign language analysis. The con-
tinuity between praxis, gesture and sign is easily recognizable at
different levels of SLs structure: formational parameters, lexicon,
morphology and syntax (see below for a more detailed discussion
of this point). Despite this special characteristic of SLs has been
widely recognized (e.g., Sandler and Lillo-Martin, 2006), only a
few studies have explored the relationship between sign language
and embodied theories, stressing the role of iconicity in sign lan-
guages (e.g., Pizzuto and Volterra, 2000; Boyes Braem et al., 2002;
Morgan et al., 2008; Perniss et al., 2010). Iconicity can provide
an additional mechanism for the grounding of language in senso-
rimotor systems; in SLs the presence of iconicity is pervasive, as
a consequence SLs can be considered a special open window to
better understand how language can be grounded. For example,
according to Taub’s (2001) cognitive-linguistic view, iconicity “is
not an objective relationship between image and referent; rather,
it is a relationship between our mental models of image and ref-
erent.” She claims that the creation of an iconic sign involves four
successive stages: conceptualization, image selection, schemati-
zation, and sign encoding. The choice of the mental image is
always mediated by cultural conventions, modality factors and
language-specific conventions. This explains also why there is
not an “Universal Sign Language” but rather many different
Sign Languages. In a recent paper, Perniss and Vigliocco (2014)
have highlighted the role of iconicity in both spoken and sign
languages considering iconicity as a major vehicle for linking lan-
guage and human sensory-motor experience. According to their
perspective, iconicity represents the key to understand language
evolution, development and processing providing a mechanism
for displacement, referentiality and embodiment. They have also
distinguished different types of iconic mapping, from a form of
iconicity based more on imitative resemblance between the sign
and the referent to a form of iconicity requiring more abstract
mapping of features.
The novelty of our work, that recognizes the special and more
evident role played by iconicity in Sign Languages, consists in
focusing not only on the different levels of abstraction of the sign-
referent mapping, but in identifying and examining a special case
of referents, those of abstract concepts. Analyzing how signs can
express abstract concepts in different ways (or through different
iconic and not iconic mechanisms) provides some contributions
to the debate on how different theories may account for abstract
words representation. LIS can indeed provide interesting insights
on the different degrees in which the various parameters of the
signs are linked to the expressed concepts. In many cases specific
locations assume an iconic meaning (for example, the majority of
signs for mental activity are performed on the forehead), in other
cases also the configuration and/or the movement performed
are salient (for example, the sign CLEAR is performed with an
open hand configuration moving away from the eyes; a grasping
movement characterizes the sign UNDERSTAND) (Pietrandrea,
2002).
SUPPORT FOR THE DIFFERENT EMBODIED THEORIES OF ABSTRACT
CONCEPTS
More crucially to the aim of the present paper, our work provides
some insights and has a number of theoretical implications for the
debate on how embodied and grounded theories might account
for abstract concepts and words (see also Dove, 2009, 2011). The
novelty of our work consists in investigating whether signs can
provide support for the different embodied theories of abstract
concepts.
In line with the previous literature on Conceptual Metaphor
Theory, we found that many signs convey a metaphorical mean-
ing and are based on underlying metaphors (e.g., the metaphors
of knowing as seeing, of the head as container of mental activities,
of the chest as container of feelings and emotions), in keeping
with the view that abstract concepts are represented through a
metaphorical mapping mechanism. However, in contrast with
previous studies we have seen that this is not the whole story, for
two main reasons.
The first is that our data support further embodied cogni-
tion theories according to which action, situations and emotions
are important for abstract concepts representation. Some signs
(e.g., the sign for IMPOSSIBLEH−fff) provide evidence in favor
of the view according to which abstract concepts are grounded
on situations; other signs (e.g., the sign TO CONSTRAIN) offer
support to the ACE view and other signs (e.g., the sign TO
EXPRESS ONESELF) provide evidence favoring the emotion theory
of abstract concepts. At a theoretical level the complex framework
we obtained cast doubts on the possibility that a single explana-
tion, for example based on a metaphorical mapping mechanism,
is valid for the entire domain of abstract concepts and terms (See
Prinz, 2002, 2012, for a similar view, according to which differ-
ent abstract concepts can be explained referring to situation, to
metaphors, to action as well as to linguistic information). At the
same time, it confirms the necessity to perform fine-grained anal-
yses of the differences between kinds of abstract concepts, analyses
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which some authors have started to conduct (e.g., Ghio et al.,
2013; Roversi et al., 2013).
The second conclusion we can make is that, even if the analysis
on LIS we performed provides support to all the aforementioned
theories, at the same time it highlights their limitations. All these
theories together are not able to fully account for the whole vari-
ety of signs we described. More importantly, they are not able
to account for signs expressing some abstract concepts, such as
truth.
We think that one of the main contributions of the present
work consists in showing that, for some abstract concepts (e.g.,
the name of a discipline such as “linguistics,” a concept such as
“truth,” etc.), LIS exploits linguistic information. This linguistic
information could derive from different sources: from the same
sign language (e.g., the LIS IMPOSSIBLEAA sign derives from the
LIS sign POSSIBLEAA), from a foreign sign language as ASL (e.g.,
LANGUAGE/LINGUA and LINGUISTICS) or from spoken/written
Italian (e.g., TRUE). This finding challenges many current embod-
ied theories of abstract concepts and clearly supports the WAT
view. More generally, it supports multiple representation views
according to which not only sensorimotor but also emotional and
especially linguistic information, differently distributed, charac-
terize abstract concepts representation (beyond the WAT theory,
see also Barsalou et al., 2008; Louwerse, 2011; see Kousta et al.,
2011, for a multiple representation view stressing the role of
emotions for abstract concepts and Dove, 2014, for a multi-
ple representation view stressing the importance of language,
similarly to WAT).
A METHODOLOGICAL NOTE
Finally, a methodological note. LIS has proved to be an interest-
ing and powerful mean to access how concepts are represented.
We hope we have been able to suggest that the study of sign
languages represents a fruitful and promising research line to
investigate issues crucial for embodied and grounded cognition
perspectives, in particular whether different degrees of embodi-
ment exist (Taub, 2001) and whether they vary depending on the
domain. Other studies have already demonstrated the importance
of the study of sign languages for an embodied and grounded per-
spective. However, to our knowledge the present study is the first
in which examples from a sign language are used to test and val-
idate different theories on abstract concepts. Obviously a certain
caution should be used, since, even though they are performed
with the body, signs are, like words, arbitrary, so it is difficult
to argue that they reflect directly the way concepts are repre-
sented. However, they are surely more grounded and to a certain
extent more “visible” than words, thus they certainly represent
an important cue to help understand conceptual representation.
The present paper, being a theoretical paper rather than an exper-
imental one, intends to indicate a possible direction of work. In
order to perform a more systematic and thorough analysis, one
would need to ask LIS signers to rate different kinds of signs in
terms of abstractness, and then select a subset of signs evaluated
as abstract and analyze them. Future work is planned to perform
such an analysis.
Overall, we think our work provides some hints for how to
address issues related to the future of embodied cognition and
to the notion of body. Our LIS analyses suggest that, even if the
signs we described always involve the body, different degrees of
embodiment might be present. Furthermore, our results suggest
that to account for abstract concepts not only sensorimotor and
emotional experience should be called into play, but that also
linguistic information plays a major role. This might appear in
conflict with an embodied approach. We believe it is not, since
language is not a disembodied activity but an important part of
our total human experience. A challenge for future research is to
identify sub-sets of abstract concepts, and to determine whether
linguistic information becomes progressively more relevant, the
higher the degree of concepts abstractness is.
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